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1. Introduction 
In global governance scholarship, it is an almost ritual-
istic acknowledgement that contemporary internation-
al relations are characterised by an escalating 
institutional fragmentation, competing/intersecting 
spheres of authority and the resulting pluralism of 
norm, rules and implementation structures. As a result, 
debates on how to govern the relationships between a 
plurality of actors with overlapping mandates and mis-
sions have proliferated which testify to the search for 
good governance norms promising to reorder frag-
mented, pluralist governance fields (Biermann, 
Pattberg, van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009; Drezner, 2007; 
Holzscheiter, 2010; Rosenau, 2004). An allegedly 
pathological complexity is also routinely diagnosed in 
global health governance. Global governance struc-
tures that were created for the provision of public 
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goods in the health area—particularly the eradication 
of infectious diseases, such as HIV—are emblematic of 
a core characteristic of global governance in the 21st 
century: the simultaneous drive of state and non-state 
actors towards more international order and more co-
herent institutional architectures on the one hand and 
on-going contestation and erosion of these institution-
al constellations on the other. While some call it a di-
lemma (Karns & Mingst, 2004), others see a dialectic 
between these two processes (Cerny, 2010; Hülsemey-
er, 2003; Rosenau, 2000, p. 177). Traditional intergov-
ernmental organisations and new forms of governance 
with or without the state, according to the literature, 
find themselves caught between their desire for au-
tonomy on the one hand and recognition of increasing 
inter-organisational interdependence on the other.1  
Global health governance often figures as a prime 
example of the much researched general trend to-
wards proliferation and pluralisation of institutional ac-
tors in global governance fields since the late 1990s 
(Inoue & Drori, 2006, pp. 205-206). Scholarly engage-
ment with these empirical transformations—in global 
health policy studies and International Relations (IR) 
alike—has shown a tremendous propensity towards 
emphasizing fragmentation, complexity and competi-
tion. The end of the Cold War did indeed stimulate a 
period of excessive experimentation and expansion in 
international organisation with the creation of a broad 
array of smaller, issue-specific organisations such as 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malar-
ia (the Global Fund). Yet, the past decade has seen the 
emergence of new initiatives, mechanisms and institu-
tions that construct new kinds of inter-organisational 
cooperation. Metaphorically speaking, these initiatives 
are meant to provide the “glue” that holds the pieces 
of the global health mosaic together. Taking this empir-
ical observation as a starting point (section 2), our pa-
per puts forward an alternative account of global 
health governance that highlights the many instances 
of convergence between international organisations 
(IOs) and rule-systems and associates them with shift-
ing discourses on what constitutes good global govern-
ance. We propose an alternative conceptual 
framework for the study of institutional constellations 
in organisational fields of contemporary global govern-
ance (section 3). This framework has two main aspects: 
First, we develop an empirical-descriptive conceptual 
toolbox which integrates the study of fragmentation 
                                                          
1 Likewise, there seems to be a discernible divide between IR 
scholars who welcome institutional fragmentation in the name 
of legal pluralism and policy-responses more adequate to con-
temporary problems, and scholars who argue in favour of 
(re)strengthening more centralised governance architectures in 
the name of global constitutionalism. Both of these “camps” 
see either a pluralist or a centralised global order as more ef-
fective and legitimate (Shaffer, 2005, p. 684 ff.). 
and convergence in inter-organisational relations so as 
to escape the one-sided focus on fragmentation. Point-
ing to the manifold instances of inter-organisational 
convergence in global health, we propose an explana-
tory framework which highlights the role of meta-
governance norms and reflexive governance practices 
to account for transformations in inter-organisational 
relations and the emergence of governance architec-
tures. That is, we argue for an analysis of historically 
grown discursive perceptions about how governance 
ought to be pursued, as well as of how such meta-
governance norms are enacted in governance practices 
to explain convergence between actors, the emergence 
and (re)organisation of order in organisational fields 
and the ensuing stabilisation of institutional constella-
tions (section 4). Accordingly, the fourth section of this 
paper traces changing interactions and institutional ar-
rangements between IOs in global health governance 
since the late 1940s and shows how patterns therein 
reflect and (re)produce broader discursive perceptions 
of what “health” is about and how the governance 
thereof ought to be organised. More specifically, we il-
lustrate how such norms and perceptions have been a 
frequent object of contestation and discontinuity and 
how over time they have included sharply divergent vi-
sions, such as the rights-based understandings ad-
vanced in the context of the “Health for All”-campaign 
which was closely connected to the Non-Aligned 
Movement on the one hand, and later approaches that 
instead located global health governance in close prox-
imity to quantitative indicators and economic devel-
opment, innovation and marketisation. Finally, we take 
a closer look at how - in this historically grown web of 
meanings and institutions - the numerous contempo-
rary initiatives towards coordination and harmonisa-
tion among global health actors came to emerge and 
how they are underpinned by the formulation of norms 
that equate good global health governance with order-
ly and harmonised interactions. 
2. Global Health Governance: Ever Greater 
Complexity? 
Over the last 20 years, the health sector has evolved in-
to one of the most popular areas of development co-
operation2—with a five-fold increase in official 
development assistance from US$ 5.6 billion in 1990 
(Ravishankar et al., 2009) to US$ 31.3 billion in 2013 
(Murray & Dieleman, 2014). The observation that 
health is currently one of the most densely populated 
                                                          
2 In comparison with other aid sectors such as agriculture and 
rural development, this shift in international priorities becomes 
particularly apparent: see ‘Trends in aid to agriculture and rural 
development between 1971 and 2009’, in OECD (2011a) and 
‘Trends in aid to health between 1971 and 2009‘, in OECD 
(2011b). 
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areas of global governance with about a hundred major 
organisations can be interpreted as either cause or 
consequence of this development (Godal, 2005; Inter-
national Development Association, 2007; Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011d; 
Schieber, Gottret, Fleisher, & Leive, 2007). Global 
health governance is therefore routinely described as a 
“messy” structure (Sidibé, Tanaka, & Buse, 2010, p. 2) 
composed of different types of actors with diverging 
motivations and rationalities. As a consequence, it is no 
longer self-evident which organisation constitutes the 
backbone of global health governance. As many claim, 
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) central posi-
tion is undermined by organisations that compete for 
legitimacy and influence on global health priorities and 
national health strategies, such as the World Bank, the 
Global Fund, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(the Gates Foundation) or global programmes like the 
U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEP-
FAR) (Huckel, 2005; Smith, 1995; Taylor, 2002), particu-
larly in developing countries. The complexity of this 
institutional landscape is especially visible in the global 
response to HIV/AIDS where numerous governmental 
and non-governmental, bilateral and multilateral agen-
cies are part of institutional structures created to re-
spond to the challenges presented by the HI-Virus. In a 
typical high HIV-prevalence country such as Namibia or 
Zambia between seven and twelve bilateral agencies or 
AIDS programmes, such as PEPFAR, and six to eight 
multilateral organisations, such as WHO, United Na-
tions Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Popula-
tion Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Development 
Programme (UNPD), the World Bank and the Global 
Fund, are contributing to the national AIDS response 
(Government of Namibia, 2010; Ministry of Health and 
Social Services of the Republic of Namibia, 2010; Na-
tional AIDS Council Zambia, 2014). These external 
agencies—particularly those belonging to the “H8”3—
provide around 50 to 90 per cent of the total budget 
for the national AIDS strategy. 
Like few other areas of governance, global health 
governance reflects a “world that is characterized by 
increasingly dense, extended and rapidly changing pat-
terns of reciprocal interdependence and by increasing-
ly frequent, but ephemeral interactions across all types 
of pre-established boundaries, intra- and inter-
organisational, intra- and intersectional and intra- and 
international” (Scharpf, 1994, p. 36). In the beginning, 
the multiplication and fragmentation of sources of au-
thority in global health governance was lauded as an 
indication of enhanced funding flows, as well as greater 
                                                          
3 The H8, or Health 8 are those IOs that are typically presented 
as particularly influential in global health: WHO; The Joint Unit-
ed Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS); UNICEF; 
UNFPA; the World Bank; Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi); the 
Global Fund and the European Commission.  
flexibility in policy-making and implementation. By 
now, however, the initial enthusiasm for such centrifu-
gal tendencies in development cooperation seems to 
have decreased in the face of an on-going “implemen-
tation crisis” (The Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV and AIDS, 2006, p. 53). Both traditional bilateral 
and multilateral agencies and more recently estab-
lished programmes and partnerships increasingly la-
ment the multiplication of players, programmes and 
sources of funding and perceive of them as producing 
suboptimal outcomes. In this governance area, collec-
tive action problems and their implications for effective 
development cooperation have been widely discussed 
and recognised for a long time. 
As a consequence of the continuing debate on the 
negative ramifications of institutional fragmentation—
particularly the administrative strain they put on al-
ready weak domestic governance structures in devel-
oping countries—global public health also ranks among 
those policy fields in which experimentation with rule-
systems and instruments of governance has been 
strongest. International actors are progressively under-
taking efforts to streamline their activities and to work 
towards agreement on a global division of labour and 
on coherent policies for programming, programme im-
plementation, technical assistance, monitoring and 
evaluation. Beyond health, this applies to various other 
densely populated areas of global governance, such as 
security, humanitarian aid or environmental protection 
(for health see Holzscheiter, Walt, & Brugha, 2012). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD), through its Development Assis-
tance Committee (OECD-DAC) has been a trend-setter 
in this domain and the major driving force behind the 
most influential approaches to principles of good gov-
ernance in development cooperation (cf. Paris Declara-
tion (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the 
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Coopera-
tion (2011c)).  
It is a remarkable finding from existing research on 
global health governance that the “appropriateness” of 
re-establishing institutional order by strengthening 
norms that outline individual responsibilities and com-
petencies of actors with overlapping mandates seems 
largely uncontested (Holzscheiter, 2015b). This points 
to a growing desire for centralisation and ordering in 
this fragmented field of governance by means of 
streamlining of policies; funding mechanisms; monitor-
ing systems; and through agreements on divisions of 
labour or the sharing of essential knowledge. As a con-
sequence, an impressive number of global frameworks 
has been developed in the past decade that seek to 
create new or strengthen existing arrangements for in-
ter-organisational cooperation—for health and for de-
velopment assistance overall. In 2010, Balabanova et. 
al. identified 75 global health partnerships and initia-
tives whose main purpose was to ensure coordination 
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between international actors, as well as between in-
ternational and domestic actors working on the same 
issues (Balabanova, McKee, Mills, Walt, & Haines, 2010). 
This contrasts with previous tendencies to create an ev-
er greater number of partnerships that addressed new, 
increasingly specialised substantive issues. Among the 
new institutional frameworks are five “signed agree-
ments” that continue to be the most important norma-
tive frameworks for inter-organisational cooperation in 
global health governance: the Paris Principles, the In-
ternational Health Partnership Global Compact, the 
Three Ones principles (developed specifically for HIV, 
but then also applied to malaria), the Global Task Team 
on Improving AIDS Coordination, and the Global Im-
plementation Support Team. As the paper seeks to 
show in the empirical discussion, these institutions and 
their underlying normative frameworks can be ac-
counted for as part of a movement of convergence be-
tween IOs that is driven by changing norms on good 
global governance. Yet before elaborating on these 
empirical observations, the next section outlines our 
proposed conceptual framework for studying institu-
tional constellations and the influence of reflexive per-
ceptions about “good governance” on the emergence 
of order amongst IOs.  
3. Explaining Inter-Organisational Convergence in 
Global Health: The Role of Metagovernance Norms  
Empirical instances of convergence between organisa-
tions have come to constitute a blind spot in the cur-
rent research landscape on inter-organisational 
relations. Against this backdrop, this paper proposes an 
alternative conceptual framework for the study of in-
stitutional constellations in organisational fields of con-
temporary global governance. Our framework has two 
main aspects: first, we develop an empirical-descriptive 
conceptual toolbox which integrates the study of frag-
mentation and convergence in inter-organisational re-
lations so as to escape the one-sided focus on 
fragmentation and ever increasing complexity, which 
has thus far characterised much scholarly engagement 
with the topic. Here, we propose to focus on the stabili-
sation of inter-organisational practices and transfor-
mations therein over time. Conceptually, we distinguish 
between i) fragmentation and convergence as process-
es which can be observed in interactions between or-
ganisations over time, and ii) the concepts of 
“governance architectures” and “governance hamlets” 
which we understand to denote more stable institu-
tional constellations that result from the consolidation 
of such practices. Second, we propose an explanatory 
framework which highlights the role of metagovern-
ance norms and reflexive governance practices to ac-
count for transformations in inter-organisational 
relations and the emergence of governance architec-
tures. That is, we argue for an analysis of historically 
grown discursive perceptions about how governance 
ought to be pursued and their enactments in govern-
ance practices to explain convergence between actors, 
the emergence and (re)organisation of order in organi-
sational fields and the ensuing stabilisation of institu-
tional constellations.  
To this end, we combine and develop further exist-
ing scholarship on reflexive governance practices, so-
called “metagovernance” and recent critical norm the-
ories in IR which conceptualize norms as “enacted 
meaning-in-use” rather than as fixed containers of 
meaning (notably, Wiener, 2007, 2014; Wiener & Puet-
ter, 2009). In a highly innovative paper, David P. Fidler 
has analysed the metaphor of “architecture” as it has 
been used in global health, finding that it is being filled 
with very disparate meanings by different actors and in 
different contexts (Fidler, 2007). It is such observations 
that we take as a starting-point in order to argue for 
the need to study the meaning-struggles revolving 
around specific notions of inter-organisational order in 
global health. Such a perspective, we contend, enables 
one to grasp convergence empirically, but more im-
portantly provides a critical constructivist account of its 
emergence. Our approach proposes to consider how 
institutional transformations in global governance are 
influenced by struggles over interpretation between 
actors, as well as of how such transformations are tied 
into and articulated within broader discourses and 
knowledge domains which define the proper “govern-
ance of governance” (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009) in a 
given historical-political context. In other words, the 
proposed framework combines the study of “power in 
discourse”, by looking at divergent enactments of 
norms and discursive struggles, with the study of the 
“power of discourse” in the sense of historically con-
tingent interpretative scripts (Holzscheiter, 2011b, 
2014) to explain the emergence of order and institu-
tional transformations in contemporary fields of global 
governance. To flesh out our concepts and situate 
them in the literature, we first introduce our empirical-
descriptive conceptual toolbox, then turn to a discus-
sion of our conceptualisation of metagovernance 
norms and practices and, finally, discuss examples from 
global health governance which—whilst surely not 
amounting to a full, systematic application of our 
framework—serve the purpose of illustrating its possi-
ble applications and empirical plausibility.  
To avoid setting a predefined focus on dynamics 
where organisational units, mandates, norms or other 
entities are seen to “drift apart” or “become more 
complex”, we suggest defining fragmentation and con-
vergence as complementary conceptual antipodes for 
the study of changing institutional constellations. Im-
portantly, we understand both terms to denote pro-
cesses that take place in inter-organisational relations 
over time rather than to describe structural traits of a 
governance field at any given isolated point in time. 
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We define convergence as an increase in the number 
and depth of cooperative relationships between two or 
more formally independent organisational units. Corre-
spondingly, we understand fragmentation to designate 
a decrease in such relationships. On a theoretical level, 
we support Biermann et. al.’s argument (2009) that all 
global policy-making can be seen as fragmented and 
complex albeit to varying degrees. Yet, we challenge 
the fruitfulness of this insight for empirical analyses of 
institutional arrangements and inter-organisational re-
lations. Instead we propose to conceptually distinguish 
between movements of increasing convergence and 
movements of greater fragmentation between organisa-
tional units so that both directions of institutional trans-
formation can be accounted for when studying concrete 
policy domains. In other words, we seek to go beyond 
the fixation on mounting ”complexity” and omnipresent 
fragmentation by proposing a research strategy that al-
lows for studying both the emergence of order and its 
disintegration by tracing patterns of interactions be-
tween IOs in the same policy field over time. 
To describe more stable, ordered patterns of inter-
action which crystallize through repetition and institu-
tionalisation in inter-organisational practices over time, 
we make use of the concept of “governance architec-
ture”. While the broader literature on fragmentation 
and regime complexity widely draws on the metaphor 
of “architecture” (Biermann et al., 2009; Dias Guerra, 
Widerberg, Isailovic, & Pattberg, 2015; Isailovic, Wid-
erberg, & Pattberg, 2013), we find that it is mostly em-
ployed indiscriminately to denote any kind of 
identifiable institutional structure.4 In our theoretical 
framework, governance architecture refers to the ex-
istence of a plurality of synchronised and stable rela-
tions between multiple IOs relevant to a policy area or 
problem. Moreover, we propose the concept “govern-
ance hamlets” to describe the opposite condition, 
namely a lack of such synchronised and stable rela-
tions. Finally, whilst we perceive of these concepts as 
corresponding with empirically observable phenome-
                                                          
4 For an exception see Fidler (2007). 
na, on a conceptual level, we suggest situating them 
between the ideal-typical concepts “integrated institu-
tion” and “atomized governance units” (see Figure 1 
below). The latter respectively denote the existence of 
one single organisational framework within which in-
ternational governance practices in a given policy area 
are carried out and the complete absence of such rela-
tions. We emphasize that both integrated institutions 
and atomised governance units are ideal-type ex-
tremes that do not exist in global governance: neither 
is there an international health organisation with an 
undisputed exclusive mandate that single-handedly 
carries out all health governance activities on the glob-
al level, nor does global health governance consist of 
free-floating, discrete health IOs that are not tied, at 
least minimally, to other institutional structures. Figure 
1 summarises the described conceptual toolbox. 
Beyond conceptualising movements of conver-
gence, fragmentation and ensuing transformations in 
institutional constellations so that they can be grasped 
empirically, the question arises how one ought to ex-
plain and account for such movements of convergence 
and fragmentation. As touched upon above, to this end 
we propose an explanatory framework that draws on 
theories of metagovernance and critical IR norms theo-
ry. That is, we suggest to consider how inter-
organisational relations in global health governance 
and other global governance domains are embedded in 
more encompassing historically grown discourses on 
the proper “governance of governance” (Jessop, 2014, 
p. 106) and to pay attention to how actors enact such 
regularities of speech and thought in reflexive govern-
ance practices, thereby (re)producing, (re)ordering and 
potentially transforming institutional constellations. 
In the most generic sense of the term, metagovern-
ance refers to the notion that governance activities 
which aim at influencing or steering societal processes 
are themselves governed by second-order governance 
practices. That is, beyond the “day-to-day” (Kooiman & 
Jentoft, 2009, p. 822) governance of society, meta-
governance refers to the “governance of governance
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Figure 1. Graphical depiction of conceptual framework. 
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itself (Jessop, 2014, p. 106; Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & 
Sørensen, 2012). Whilst competing notions of meta-
governance exist that will not be elaborated here in 
any greater detail, for the sake of clarity it is important 
to stress that we use metagovernance as an open ana-
lytical concept which serves to denote a reflexive quali-
ty of governance practices and discourses forming 
around them. Extant scholarly understandings of the 
term have ranged from such analytical conceptualisa-
tions to more empirical-descriptive ones. To exemplify 
the latter category, in Cologne School theorizing 
(Mayntz, 1999; Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 
2007), integration theory (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997; 
Rhodes, 1996, 1997), Luhmann-inspired scholarship 
(Braun, 1993; Luhmann, 1984), but also in more recent 
theoretical accounts of democratic governance (Torfing 
et al., 2012; Torfing & Sørensen, 2007), metagovern-
ance tends to be understood as a novel, postmodern 
kind of governance which aims at steering and/or op-
erates through horizontal networks and independent 
societal subsystems. Consequently, it is often typologi-
cally juxtaposed to other governance modes such as 
hierarchical coordination (state) and market exchange. 
In conceptualising metagovernance as a second-order, 
reflexive form of governance we instead side with the 
open analytical pole on this theoretical spectrum. From 
such a viewpoint, metagovernance might be concerned 
with state/hierarchy, market, networks or indeed with 
other governance practices, but is ultimately defined 
by its reflexive quality: by aiming to redesign govern-
ance in a self-referential manner. To exemplify this 
kind of conceptualization, it is worthwhile to consider 
Bob Jessop’s theoretical approach.  
Following Jessop, first-order governance denotes 
non-reflexive activities aimed at directing societal 
spheres through different “forms of coordination”, 
namely imperative organisation, heterarchy, exchange 
and solidarity (Jessop, 2014, p. 112). Metagovernance, 
in turn, refers to governance practices which (re)define 
the operation of first-order governance modes (“first-
order metagovernance”) or their relative importance in 
governing any given societal realm (“second-order 
metagovernance”, Jessop, 2014, pp. 112-116). In other 
words, in Jessop’s terminology, first-level metagovern-
ance refers to the reflexive redesign of markets, au-
thority structures, self-organisation and bases for 
solidarity—“loyalty, trust, and commitment” (Jessop, 
2014, pp. 114-115), whilst second-order metagovern-
ance denotes “the asymmetrical privileging of different 
modes of coordination” (Jessop, 2014, p. 116). As a fur-
ther example, Jan Kooiman and Svein Jentoft advance 
an understanding of metagovernance that is similarly 
premised on a distinction between levels of reflexivity 
in defining it as an “order where values, norms and 
principles are advanced according to which governance 
practices can be formed and evaluated” (Kooiman & 
Jentoft, 2009, p. 823). Finally, Andrew Dunsire’s pro-
posal to use the term “collibration” to describe the 
“manipulation of balancing social tensions, the con-
trolled shifting of a social equilibrium, the fine tuning 
of an oscillation of near-equal forces” (Dunsire, 1993, 
p. 11) constitutes a related concept as it is concerned 
with activities that ”set the frame” within which every-
day practices of governance take their course.  
For the study of inter-organisational relations in 
realms of global governance, adopting a perspective 
which is informed by a thus defined understanding of 
metagovernance therefore sharpens our gaze for 
common activities and practices between organisations 
which define and reshape the framework within which 
governance takes place—such as the creation of new 
venues for coordination amongst institutions or the re-
ordering of relationships between existing mechanisms 
and arenas. To exemplify, in the realm of global health 
governance, we argue that this theoretical lens renders 
visible the reflexive, ordering quality of a range of initi-
atives and practices amongst institutions which have 
emerged since the late 1990s. The International Health 
Partnership (IHP+; and related initiatives) that was es-
tablished in 2007, for example, has become a widely 
accepted harmonisation mechanism for multilateral 
and bilateral development cooperation for health. It 
provides for Compacts between donors and recipients 
at the domestic level, which constitute negotiated 
agreements between governments and development 
partners with the aim to reduce donor fragmentation, 
harmonise donor action and improve alignment with 
the national health system. The number of these Com-
pacts has grown continuously over the years 
(Holzscheiter, 2011a; Shorten, Taylor, Spicer, Mounier-
Jack, & McCoy, 2012) which points to the increasing in-
stitutionalisation of the partnership as a mechanism to 
order the relationships between multiple organisations 
(Buse, 2004; Buse & Walt, 2002). In Jessop’s terminolo-
gy, the establishment of such harmonisation mecha-
nisms can be analytically described as practices which 
combine elements of metaheterarchy between IOs, 
e.g. the reordering of relations in a network-like struc-
ture, and elements of metaorganisation, as the more 
specific agreements between donors, recipient and de-
velopment partners inevitably address and hence 
might “tilt” the balance of relative authority between 
the said actors in the respective area of concern. An-
other example for such harmonising initiatives was the 
“H4+” Partnership which—until 2016—constituted an 
inter-organisational structure holding together six 
United Nations (UN) organisations (UNAIDS, UNFPA, 
UNICEF, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and 
the Empowerment of Women [UN Women], WHO and 
the World Bank). This group of H4+ acted as the lead 
technical partner for the implementation of the UN 
Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health and 
as a central implementation mechanism for Millennium 
Development Goals 4 (Child Health) and 5 (Maternal 
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Health). As these kinds of reflexive, ordering practices 
increase in numbers, stabilise and consolidate over 
time, they unfold a transformative effect on the institu-
tional constellation in the field as a whole. In other 
words, the emergence and proliferation of meta-
governance can be seen to change the functioning and 
nature of global health governance in the aggregate, as 
despite the continuing plurality of actors, their interac-
tions amongst each other increasingly follow more sta-
ble, sedimented paths. This kind of emergent order in 
inter-organisational relations is what we propose to de-
scribe as an emerging “governance architecture”.  
Now, if the transformation of institutional constel-
lations and emergence of order in global governance 
policy realms might be accounted for by considering 
how reflexive governance practices stabilise over time, 
a crucial question has still been left unaddressed. To 
stick to the empirical realm of global health govern-
ance, why did IOs in the historical institutional setting 
just discussed perceive of a need to ”harmonise” and 
”coordinate” their activities, rather than to pursue any 
alternative course of action, using other words and en-
gaging in other activities? How, more specifically, did 
the overarching rhetorical commitment to the principle 
of harmonisation translate into tangible practices and 
how would some of them come to gradually acquire a 
higher level of stability and institutionalisation? As 
touched upon earlier, in order to uncover the specifici-
ty and explain the diachronic stabilisation of emergent 
orders in inter-organisational fields, we propose to 
draw on recent theoretical proposals in critical IR 
norms research. Norms research continues to be a 
popular field of scholarly inquiry in the field of IR and it 
has made significant advances with regard to explain-
ing how norms emerge, unfold and transform. Early 
norms research predominantly pursued the quest to 
identify norms in international politics, to explain why 
they emerge and under what conditions they diffuse 
(actors; opportunity structures; hegemonic actors; is-
sue characteristics) (Colonomos, 2001; Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Nadelmann, 1990; 
Price, 1998; Risse, 2002). Newer research on norms has 
shifted emphasis to observing and explaining what 
happens to international norms in the long run, how 
they transform, translate into different contexts and 
also how their meaning and effects are contingent on 
(re)production in practice (Grillot, 2011; Krook & True, 
2012; Wiener, 2009; Zwingel, 2012). The idea that 
norms structure social life while at the same time being 
contested and loaded with controversies is a central 
tenet of contemporary critical norms research. Our 
ambition to trace the institutional evolution in global 
health ties in with this second wave of norms research 
inasmuch as we embrace the assumption that norms 
simultaneously have a structuring and contingent qual-
ity. To study the existence and effects of metagovern-
ance norms in global health through discourses on 
good global health governance is thus, in our view, a 
necessary endeavour with regard to identifying both 
periods of normative stability and periods of move-
ment and transformation.  
In contrast to the rationalist institutionalist main-
stream which has so far dominated the engagement 
with inter-organisational relations in the field of IR re-
search (Jönsson, 1986; Koops & Varwick, 2009) we thus 
propose a constructivist account of how metagovern-
ance practices emerge and unfold. That is, we suggest 
that the reflexive reordering and redesigning of gov-
ernance itself—which the concept of metagovernance 
enables us to highlight—is embedded, enacted and re-
produced in broader historically grown discourses 
about the appropriate “governance of governance”. 
Drawing on Antje Wiener’s account of norms as “en-
acted meaning-in-use” (Wiener, 2009) we conceptual-
ize metagovernance norms as contingent perceptions 
about how governance ought to be pursued that are 
enacted and negotiated in social practices (cf. also 
Wiener, 2007; Wiener & Puetter, 2009). If we under-
stand the term discourse as a more encompassing con-
cept which refers to an overarching regularity or 
formation of perceptions/knowledge and practices that 
delineate the borders of what is reasonably thinkable 
in a given socio-political context (cf. Foucault, 1972), 
metagovernance norms can be described as a category 
of discursive objects which emerge as parts of such dis-
courses to establish moral, ethical imperatives (what is 
believed to be “good”) and are closely interwoven with 
causal beliefs (what is believed to be “necessary” and 
“possible”) about how governance ought to be pursued 
and organised. Conceptualising metagovernance norms 
as a category of discursive objects, rather than as fixed 
normative entities or stable “standards of appropriate 
behavior for actors within a given identity” (Katzen-
stein, 1996, p. 5) has important consequences for their 
analysis. First, if discourse is historically contingent and 
reproduced in social practices, the meaning of norms is 
principally open to divergent and indeed conflicting in-
terpretations amongst actors in the same field. Or, to 
reformulate this point by borrowing a phrase from 
Wiener, as “the rule always lies in the prac-
tice…norms—and their meanings [are] contested by 
default” (Wiener, 2007, p. 5). Second, such a perspec-
tive underlines the necessity to consider how the pow-
er of norms is underpinned by and made possible 
through the discursive context in which they emerge; 
to inquire into their relationship with other discursive 
objects, causal beliefs and knowledge domains. Both of 
these points, finally, should encourage us to engage 
with the delicate relationship between norms and 
power by addressing how, on the one hand, power is 
exerted by actors in discourse through struggles about 
the meaning of norms, as well as how, on the other 
hand, the power of discourse restricts the realm of rea-
sonably speakable statements—the political and factu-
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al imaginary—within which actors struggle, rearticulate 
and enact norms about how to govern. Let us once 
again turn to the example of global health governance 
to illustrate what these theoretical considerations 
might imply for empirical research. 
4. Shifting Discourses and Norms of Good Global 
Health Governance 
We are certainly not the first to explore the contesta-
tion revolving around the notion of “global health gov-
ernance” in terms of what it means, which actors it 
includes and where its boundaries are (Cooper, Kirton, 
& Schrecker, 2007; Fidler, 2007; Hein, Bartsch, & Kohl-
morgen, 2007; Lee & Kamradt-Scott, 2014). However, 
we seek to advance this debate by proposing to study in-
ter-organisational practices and the meanings enacted 
therein across time. Such a focus, we suggest, delivers 
important insights into the normative underpinnings of 
global health and promises to shed light on how mean-
ing-struggles transform and give rise to distinct pat-
terns of interaction between organisations. To study 
discourses on “good global health governance” as they 
evolve among health organisations themselves, thus, is 
necessary in order to uncover the procedural norms 
that have structured and ordered inter-organisational 
interactions at specific points in time. In other words, 
we believe that our perspective represents an innova-
tive take on the subject by making visible how inter-
organisational interactions in global health governance 
are being structured by metagovernance norms while, 
at the same time, enabling us to consider how such 
norms are continuously (re)negotiated. To illustrate 
this point, the strong negative connotation that is rou-
tinely attached to the terms “fragmentation” and 
“complexity” can be identified as a textual representa-
tion of a powerful, overarching belief that unites the 
world of science and the world of practice in global 
health. Social Science and Public Health research on 
global health have been largely dominated by rational-
ist–functionalist institutionalist theory in which the ex-
istence of overlapping or even competing rule-systems 
and organisational mandates is mostly perceived as a 
dysfunctional feature of regime complexes and associ-
ated with high transaction costs. These transaction 
costs are often related to the duplication of manage-
ment structures targeting the same issue or problem; 
the duplication of operational activities in the field; in-
congruent indicators for monitoring policy issues; or 
the co-existence of different and often contradictory 
rule-systems that states (and other actors) should 
comply with domestically. The formula “coordina-
tion/harmonisation = more effectiveness” has emerged 
as almost a truism or at least a strong causal belief 
about what constitutes “good governance” in commu-
nities of scholars and practitioners alike. Harmonisa-
tion of this orchestra of global health—which is not 
only perceived to be many-piece but also dissonant—
emerges as a normatively desirable solution that prom-
ises to cure problems of ineffectiveness and inefficien-
cy. The following section provides examples from 
different discourses on global health and demonstrates 
that this turn towards “harmonisation” constitutes a 
significant change in metagovernance norms, reflected 
not only in the rhetorical commitment of all major in-
ternational health agencies to harmonisation as a 
metagovernance principle—but more importantly in 
the many interactions that health IOs have undertaken 
to translate these principles into practice.  
4.1. Early Periods of Global Health Governance:  
1940s–1970s and 1970s–2000s 
International cooperation in health matters dates back 
to the mid-19th century when the first International 
Sanitary Conference was convened in response to a se-
ries of worrying cholera outbreaks in Europe. WHO, 
that was established in 1948, owes its historical legacy 
to two predecessors: the International Sanitary Bureau 
established in 1902 in Washington (later named the 
Pan-American Sanitary Bureau) and the Office Interna-
tional d'Hygiène Publique (OIHP) established in Paris in 
1907 (Fidler, 1997, 1999, 2001; Goodman, 1977). How-
ever, the international institutional structures propping 
up the issue of health were built after 1945, originating 
in the WHO with a much broader and truly “interna-
tional” mandate than earlier organisations as well as 
more specialised IOs with health-related tasks such as 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNICEF or 
the World Bank. For this reason, our account of inter-
organisational cooperation in global health governance 
starts in the late 1940s. Most of the health-related IOs 
that were established after the Second World War cen-
tred on the promotion of health as an instrument for 
economic development and overall progress. Health 
became “a tool for enabling the full utilization of hu-
man capital” (Inoue & Drori, 2006, p. 209). In the early 
period of international organisation in the field of 
health (1940–1970), thus, classical state-centred inter-
national politics and a global health policy field revolv-
ing around WHO conjured up an image of health 
governance as based on a relatively straightforward di-
vision of labour between the latter organisation and 
national governments or their ministries of health. This 
organisation of governance points towards metaorgan-
isation as a prevalent type of second-order governance 
in which WHO constituted the undisputed focal-point 
for all other actors in the “health universe”.  
The 1970s and 1980s constituted the beginning of 
“unsettled periods” (Swidler, 1986, p. 273) in global 
health, as during these decades discourses on health 
were changing and new powerful agencies entered the 
arena. On the one hand, thinking on internation-
al/global health policymaking was influenced by trends 
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associated with the “Health for All”-movement and the 
movement for a “New Economic Order” within the 
United Nations. Some aspects of this intellectual cur-
rent included the framing of health as a right and the 
insistence that health policy should be holistic and fo-
cus on health systems (Lidén, 2013, pp. 14-15). This 
early infusion of the field of health policy with dis-
courses on human rights, equity and social justice, ini-
tiated a growing politicisation of WHO under its 
Secretary-General Halfdan Mahler (1973–1988) which, 
in turn, led to an increasing estrangement of WHO 
from some of its Member States. At the same time, the 
1970s also saw the rise of further, competing percep-
tions which associated “good governance” in the realm 
of global health with policies underpinned by a view of 
health as a factor in achieving economic development 
and poverty reduction. According to some commenta-
tors, the World Bank was instrumental in transmitting 
this “health and development”-discourse which had 
been formulated and constructed in academia (Ruger, 
2005) into the field of global health policy in the 1970s. 
As one author notes, the Bank “has persuasively ar-
gued that alleviating global poverty and achieving 
broad-based development requires healthy people. Ill 
health puts a drain on a state’s resources, and un-
healthy people cannot contribute to a country’s eco-
nomic development” (Youde, 2012, p. 46). The World 
Bank introduced quantification of (expected) policy 
outcomes as a measure to determine where policy “in-
terventions” would be most efficient. Following some 
authors, this stood in contrast to the emphasis of WHO 
on strengthening health systems. The Bank’s 1993 
World Development Report entitled “Investing in 
Health” made sweeping, yet influential recommenda-
tions in this regard: It pushed the notion of efficiency in 
health policy and national health systems in pursuit of 
the larger aim of poverty reduction, e.g., by calling for 
private sector involvement, and introduced quantifia-
ble measures to assess the burden of diseases (espe-
cially Disability-Adjusted Life Years—DALYs) (Ruger, 
2005, p. 66). The conception of health entailed therein 
was widely perceived as contradicting that of WHO 
(Davies 2010: 45-6 as cited in Youde, 2012, p. 51). De-
ciding on health “interventions” on the basis of quanti-
tative indicators of efficiency became the new standard 
in the field of global health. This could in part be at-
tributed to the influence of the World Bank that is 
grounded in its lending power, but can also be seen as 
a reflection of broader discursive shifts towards linking 
“good governance” to economic efficiency and the ne-
oliberal Zeitgeist of the 1990s that presented privatisa-
tion and quantification as more efficient alternatives to 
the way global health had previously been governed.  
A closer look at the Global Burden of Disease and 
Disease Control Priorities Project allows us to trace 
some of the mentioned changes in health governance. 
The Global Burden of Disease-approach refers to the 
attempt to quantify the burden of specific diseases in 
order to inform policy-making. Results of this project 
were first included in the abovementioned 1993 World 
Development Report. The project was initially housed 
at WHO, which formalized its work through a Disease 
Burden Unit in 1998 and has published its updated re-
sults over the years (Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation, 2015). The updated report of 2010, howev-
er, received funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation and was put together by the World Bank, 
WHO and the Fogarty International Center of the U.S. 
National Institutes of Health (Jamison et al., 2010 front 
matter). Today, coordination of updates to the report 
has moved to the Institute for Health Metrics and Eval-
uation, which was co-founded by the Gates Founda-
tion. The Global Burden of Disease Project could be 
interpreted as an institutional embodiment of the rise 
of effectiveness and numerical indicators and “health 
interventions” to combat specific diseases, in contrast 
to approaches to health governance that favour health 
systems strengthening. It also points to the increasing 
participation of non-state actors in the governance of 
global health, with the gradual move of the project 
away from “traditional” health IOs.  
This trend equally affected other IOs. As new global 
health organisations were founded after 1990 (e.g., 
UNAIDS, Global Fund), their mandates came to reflect 
a perceived necessity to open up IOs to increased col-
laboration with other health actors, particularly with 
non-governmental organisations (Holzscheiter, 2015b, 
p. 8). To illustrate further, consider the Multi-Country 
HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) that was founded by the 
World Bank in 2000 as “a central, prominent lending 
program” (Youde, 2012, p. 56) to combat HIV/AIDS. It 
seems remarkable how much this programme sought 
to avoid working with state actors as it explicitly re-
quired receiving states to disburse significant portions 
of the funds to non-state actors, including “civil society 
organizations, national nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and community groups” (Youde, 2012, p. 56). We 
thus broadly see that over time cooperation in health 
governance changed from inter-agency partnerships 
usually sustained by WHO, the World Bank and others 
to so-called “innovative” partnerships that accorded a 
more significant role to non-state actors. The discours-
es on “innovation” and “partnership” were accompa-
nied by an increasing number of private actors as 
funders and partners in health governance, the high-
lighting of quantitative evidence as the basis for policy 
decisions (“health interventions”) and the evaluation of 
their effectiveness, as well as the desire to use “mar-
ket-based” mechanisms to fund research and the de-
velopment of vaccines. In sum, the discussed 
transformations in global health governance from the 
1970s to early 2000s therefore point to how meta-
governance norms, about the desirability of privatisa-
tion of governance and pluralisation of actors, together 
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with causal beliefs produced in scholarly discourse 
which underpin such perceptions (e.g. evidence that 
market based-mechanisms produce more “efficient” 
results) might translate into second-order meta-
governance practices that change the relative im-
portance of imperative coordination, heterarchy and 
exchange—in this case to the advantage of the latter 
two forms of coordination.  
4.2. Global Health Governance after the Turn of the 
Millennium: 2000s–Present  
In contrast to the “health and development”-discourse 
and the associated metagovernance norms about “pri-
vatisation”, “pluralisation” and “policy innovation”, 
discourses forming around terms such as “coordina-
tion”, “harmonisation” and “partnership” took centre 
stage in the 2000s. The call for harmonisation has be-
come ubiquitous across all current major global health 
issues (Holzscheiter, 2015b, p. 3). Not least through the 
harmonisation principle contained in the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness has this norm made its 
way from development cooperation to health govern-
ance (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment, 2005). For example, the Three Ones 
Principles were adopted around the same time with 
the explicit aim to harmonise action by multilateral and 
bilateral donors addressing HIV/ AIDS through One Na-
tional AIDS Strategy, One National Monitoring & Evalu-
ation System and One National AIDS Authority (The 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS, 
2004). The Paris Declaration and the Three Ones Prin-
ciples have unfolded their converging effect on the 
field of global health governance. The Global Fund, the 
World Bank and the UN family more generally have 
been most active in this regard (Holzscheiter, 2015b, p. 
14). Particularly the Paris Principles are reflected in the 
organisational philosophies and strategies of all im-
portant health IOs (Holzscheiter, 2015b, p. 14). Beyond 
statements on paper, health IOs have built forums 
through which they seek to harmonise their activities, 
including IHP+ and the H4+ partnership. They bring and 
brought together staff of different IOs in temporary 
expert and working groups that are jointly hosted by 
these IOs (Holzscheiter, 2015b, pp. 14-15). To illustrate, 
consider IHP+, which is hosted by WHO and the World 
Bank to “enhance aid effectiveness…through effective 
collaboration and coordination of various partnerships 
and initiatives” (World Health Organization/World 
Health Assembly, 2010, p. 2). The changes that the Par-
is Declaration has induced in health IOs’ policies and 
practices testifies to the effect of the harmonisation 
norm that has unfolded in the health policy field as a 
whole. Harmonisation and coordination have become 
synonymous with “better” health governance, i.e., 
health governance that is viewed as more legitimate 
and effective (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Re-
lief, 2007; The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria, 2010; cf. The Joint United Nations Pro-
gramme on HIV and AIDS, 2006). In contemporary dis-
courses on “good governance” in global health, 
harmonisation and coordination constitute broadly ac-
cepted—indeed even largely unchallenged—principles 
(Holzscheiter, 2015a). They can hence be described as 
powerful metagovernance norms which are under-
pinned by discursive perceptions and regularities posit-
ing their necessity and desirability, such as the 
frequently occurring opposition to “fragmentation” in 
scholarly discourse and the discussed negative conno-
tation of this term. 
However, the more precise meaning of the term 
“harmonisation” and in particular the practical conse-
quences for the organisation of governance that it is 
seen to entail, are far from undisputed. In other words, 
whilst the desirability of harmonisation as such is cur-
rently uncontested, its exact meaning is more unstable 
and hence the object of struggle between competing 
interpretations and enactments. On the one hand, 
some attempts at fixating the meaning of harmonisa-
tion understand it as requiring a coherence of action by 
diverse health IOs, as was illustrated in the foregoing 
examples of IHP+ and H4+. On the other hand, other 
actors envision harmonisation as entailing a division of 
labour between health IOs in which roles are divided 
on the basis of specialised functions and comparative 
advantages (The Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV and AIDS Lancet Commission, 2013). To exemplify, 
the latter version of the harmonisation norm was em-
bodied in a 2014 partnership agreement between the 
Global Fund and WHO which spells out their division of 
labour in the field. The agreement envisages that WHO 
should support countries seeking funds from the Global 
Fund with technical assistance (World Health Organiza-
tion, 2014). In a similar vein, the Global Fund has also 
spelled out its relationship with UNAIDS and UNICEF, 
amongst other UN organisations (The Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2009). The for-
mer agreement shows that WHO has managed to reas-
sert its authority in this particular relationship by 
translating a specific interpretation of the harmonisa-
tion norm into inter-organisational, reflexive practices 
and hence illustrates that IOs actively seek to seize 
metagovernance norms to stake out their spheres of 
authority (cf. Holzscheiter, 2015b, pp. 16-17).  
The field of global health governance provides fur-
ther examples of convergence through a division of la-
bour: around 2000, with the adoption of the 
Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals and with immense frustration regarding 
the AIDS epidemic and other infectious diseases, a 
whole series of vertical health partnerships were estab-
lished. Among the most prominent of these partner-
ships were the Roll Back Malaria Initiative (1998), the 
Stop TB Partnership (2000) and Gavi (2000). These 
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partnerships were explicitly designed as institutions 
aiming at metaheterarchy and metaexchange, i.e. re-
flexive, voluntary and horizontal forms of cooperation 
which sought to reorder networks of health actors and 
related markets (for access to medicines, research & 
development, health personnel, etc.). Many of these 
partnerships—such as Stop TB or Roll Back Malaria—
are so-called “hosted” partnerships, which means that 
their secretariats are located at WHO, UNICEF or other 
UN organisations and are thus not free-standing legal 
entities. Others, such as Gavi, were set up as organisa-
tions operating in the geographical vicinity of, but in-
dependently from, UN organisations. Following a 
decision of the WHO Executive Board in 2013 and a 
protracted debate on the legal status of these hosted 
partnerships, serval memoranda of understanding 
were set up that either aim at re-establishing WHO’s 
authority over the partnerships or seek to clarify the di-
vision of labour between the organisation and the part-
nerships by delineating their respective “spheres of 
authority”.5 In that instance, we thus witness a move-
ment of convergence in the field of global health that is 
driven by the reflexive reorganisation of authority struc-
tures: after the period of “policy innovation”, “pluraliza-
tion” and “privatisation” in the 1990s and early 2000s 
that saw the founding of new health IOs and novel kinds 
of initiatives, such as the Roll Back Malaria Initiative, Ga-
vi and the Global Fund, more recent global health gov-
ernance is characterised by an opposite movement in 
patterns of interaction between organisations towards a 
partial return to the leading role of WHO and thus to-
wards privileging imperative coordination as well as 
noticeable efforts by IOs to clarify and divide roles. 
Even those organisations and partnerships that 
emerged in the wake of the innovation and partnership 
discourses have felt compelled to clarify how they re-
late to their older peers that were once dismissed as 
relics of ineffective, hierarchical bureaucracy and have 
sometimes—as was shown above in the case of the 
Global Fund—deferred to their pedigree in the name of 
harmonisation and effectiveness. To conclude, it ap-
pears that a rationalist–functionalist perspective on 
global health governance that focuses exclusively on the 
increase in actors and rules lends itself to the hasty con-
clusion that this policy field is inevitably messy, while a 
closer analysis can reveal stabilising relationships and 
historically changing, discursively embedded instances of 
metagovernance that reflexively rearrange the parame-
ters within which health IOs interact and operate. 
5. Conclusions  
Embarking from a critique of the one-sided focus on 
the bewilderingly “complex” aspects of fragmentation 
                                                          
5 See for example Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Roll Back Malaria Partnership and WHO (2006). 
and complexity in contemporary global governance 
scholarship, the bulk of the present paper has present-
ed an alternative framework for the analysis of inter-
organisational relations in global governance fields. 
More specifically, we have argued for an historical per-
spective that conceives of convergence and fragmenta-
tion as opposite, mirroring patterns of interaction 
between organisations. As they evolve over the course 
of time, they give rise to governance constellations of 
varying density; in our proposed terminology these 
could range from “governance architectures” to “gov-
ernance hamlets” (see above pp. 6-7). In order to ac-
count for such transformations, we sketched out an 
explanatory framework that draws on theories of 
metagovernance and critical IR norms theory in sug-
gesting that inter-organisational practices are driven 
by, or rather can be seen to constitute enactments of, 
discursive perceptions about the proper “governance 
of governance”. In contrast to the rationalist–
functionalist institutionalisms that have so far domi-
nated much of the social science engagement with 
global (health) governance, we propose a constructivist 
approach that distinguishes between different levels of 
reflexivity to explain emergent orders in global govern-
ance. The empirical examples and indications given in 
this paper are a first step towards a more systematic 
analysis of both discourses and practices of meta-
governance in global health governance. However, the 
above empirical analysis clearly indicates that inter-
organisational patterns of interaction are embedded in 
and informed by broader discourses on how one can 
and ought to govern. As we show above, dominant 
perceptions about what constitutes "good governance 
of governance" in the health realm are distinctly histor-
ically contingent: For the past few decades they have 
ranged from rights-based understandings connected to 
visions of a more equitable “New Economic Order”, to 
discourses that locate global health governance within 
frames of quantitative economic output and develop-
ment, innovation and marketisation. Moreover, in 
many of these instances, causal beliefs and implicit 
normative connotations transcend the borders be-
tween the practice of global health governance and 
scholarly engagement therewith. For instance, an 
overarching negative connotation of the terms “frag-
mentation” and “complexity” has crystallized in both 
realms through the last decade, often assuming the 
function of causal background knowledge that makes it 
possible for “harmonization” to figure as a logical, 
common sense solution to ineffectiveness and ineffi-
ciency. Yet, as the above diachronic tracing of inter-
organisational interactions, institutional developments 
and their discursive embeddedness also points to, the 
more precise meaning of dominant metagovernance 
norms and hence their translation into practice, far 
from being a technical matter, constitutes a continuous 
object of contestation. As we illustrate above, in the 
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case of harmonization, struggles have erupted be-
tween enactments that interpret the norm as suggest-
ing a stronger centralization of governance processes 
or in other words a move towards hierarchy, and oth-
ers that posit the meaning of the norm as a greater 
functional division of labour between IO actors along 
lines of comparative advantage. To conclude, studying 
institutional constellations as a product of historical 
processes of discursive struggle and stabilisation 
sharpens our gaze for their contingent, non-technical 
and hence political origins. Moreover, this gives reason 
to reconsider the undisputed focus on enhancing effec-
tiveness of pre-existing governance arrangements that 
has determined the course of much research on global 
governance.   
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